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Abstract
In this paper, we conduct a theoretical analysis of inspections in a stochastic environment
and we shed light on two hitherto unstudied issues concerning inspections in the context of invasive
species management. First, given a particular port of entry in a country, we study the properties of
a random inspection scheme. Second, we compute the average total fines that will be collected in
the long run by an inspection agency that uses the above inspection scheme to screen arriving ships
for the presence of one or more invasive species. 
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4Invasive species are also referred to as alien species, as exotic species, and as non-native species.
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1. Introduction
There is no gainsaying the fact that we now live in an era of globalization. The phenomena
of globalization in general and shocking recent events involving terrorism in the United States (US),
Spain, and the United Kingdom have generated great interest in issues concerning security across
the world. In the US in particular, this interest has manifested itself in the substantially increased
interest in inspecting goods that are brought into the country from other parts of the world by means
of airplanes, trucks, and, perhaps most notably, ships. This concern with seaport security in
particular is not misplaced. As The Economist (Anonymous, 2006) has recently noted, only about
five percent of the containers that bring two billion tonnes of cargo to US seaports are actually
inspected. Therefore, it is not difficult at all for all kinds of illegal goods and possibly detrimental
animal and plant species to get into the US. 
Batabyal (2004), Work et al. (2005) and DeAngelo et al. (2007) have clearly demonstrated
that in addition to transporting goods between regions, airplanes, trucks, and ships have unwittingly
also managed to carry all manner of invasive plant and animal species4 from one part of the world
to another. This inadvertent carriage has taken place in many different ways. Three examples follow.
First, on occasion, invasive animal species have succeeded in lodging themselves in the landing gear
of airplanes and, in this way, they have traveled as stowaways from one part of the world to another.
Second, a number of marine invasive species have been introduced inadvertently into a particular
part of the world by ships dumping their ballast water. Cargo ships often carry ballast water in order
to boost vessel stability when they are not carrying full loads. When these ships come into a seaport,
this ballast water must be discarded before cargo can be loaded. Finally, and perhaps most
4significantly, ships and trucks have introduced invasive species into a particular part of the world
by means of the containers they routinely use to carry cargo from one part of the world to another.
In this context, the reader should understand that invasive species can remain concealed in
containers for extended periods of time. In addition, the material such as wood that is commonly
used to pack the cargo in the containers may itself contain invasive species. 
Biological invasions of new habitats by non-native species have frequently resulted in great
losses to society. For the US alone, the extent of these losses is massive. In this regard, Keller and
Lodge (2007) have noted that the state of Indiana spends more than $600,000 each year to control
a particular invasive species, namely, the Eurasian watermilfoil. Similarly, Kolar and Lodge (2001)
have pointed out that the total costs of all invasive species is around $137 billion per year. In
addition to these economic costs, invasive species have also given rise to serious biological damage.
For instance, Vitousek et al. (1996) have demonstrated that invasive species can change ecosystem
processes, act as vectors of diseases, and diminish biological diversity. Cox (1993) has pointed out
that out of 256 vertebrate extinctions with a known cause, 109 are the outcome of biological
invasions. The implication of the discussion in this paragraph is clear. Invasive species have
frequently been a great menace to society. 
Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of managerial actions that one can take to control the
spread of invasive species and their deleterious effects. These are pre-invasion and post-invasion
actions. The purpose of pre-invasion actions is to preclude non-native species from invading a new
habitat. In contrast, post-invasion actions are intended to control a non-native species, given that this
species has already invaded a new habitat. In recent times, several researchers have analyzed a
particular kind of pre-invasion action, namely, inspections. McAusland and Costello (2004) have
5shown that when one considers the future effects of current invasive species introductions, one is
led to a course of action that may involve the use of higher or lower tariffs but certainly involves
more stringent inspections. Batabyal and Nijkamp (2005) have shown that in an inspection cycle,
the so called “container policy” is preferable to the so called “temporal policy” because the former
policy leads to lower long run expected net costs from inspections. Using a model of seaport
inspections, Batabyal (2006, 2008) has provided a rationale for and has developed aspects of the
differential regulatory treatment of imports when invasive species are a potential problem. Batabyal
and Yoo (2006) have analyzed the statistical properties of what they call a generic container
inspection policy. Finally, DeAngelo et al. (2007) have used a queuing theoretic model of
inspections to show that the question as to whether there is or is not a tension between the objectives
of economic cost reduction and biological invasion damage control cannot be resolved
unambiguously. 
The papers discussed in the previous paragraph have surely advanced many aspects of our
understanding of the role of inspections in invasive species management. Even so, there are two
salient issues about inspections that have received no attention in the literature. Hence, in this paper,
we conduct a theoretical analysis of these two hitherto unstudied issues in a stochastic environment.
Specifically, in section 2.1, we describe a stylized model of inspections in which ships—possibly
with injurious invasive species—arrive at a seaport in a country called Home. Next, in section 2.2,
we study the properties of a random inspection scheme. Then, in section 2.3, we compute the
average total fines that will be collected in the long run by an inspection agency that uses the above
inspection scheme to screen arriving ships for the presence of invasive species. Finally, section 3
concludes and then makes suggestions for extending the research described in this paper. 
5We stress that our subsequent analysis does not depend on the port of entry being a seaport. Our analysis would go through for land
ports of entry—such as a border crossing or an airport—as well.
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This random inspection scheme is based on the “continuous sampling” plan first formulated by Dodge (1943) and subsequently
extended by White (1966) and by Bebbington et al. (2003).
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2. The Theoretical Model
2.1. Preliminaries
Consider a port of entry such as a seaport in an arbitrary country called Home.5 Our
subsequent analysis is conducted from the perspective of an inspection agency that has been entrusted
with the task of inspecting arriving ships in this seaport for the presence of one or more invasive
species. The reader should note that as used in this paper, the term “inspection” refers to the
examination of the containers that are used by ships to transport cargo or to the examination of the
ballast water occasionally held by arriving ships or to the examination of both containers and ballast
water. 
Home engages in goods trade with a whole host of nations and hence ships from these various
nations arrive in our seaport in Home to unload and/or to load cargo. Now, as noted in Batabyal
(2006, 2008), the risk of inadvertent biological invasions in Home typically varies by trading partner.
Therefore, consistent with the analysis in Batabyal (2006, 2008), we suppose that our seaport
inspection agency has distinct protocols for inspecting the arriving ships from distinct nations. Put
differently, ships arriving from country  are treated differently than ships arriving from country 
for any two arbitrary countries  and  Let us now delineate the random inspection scheme that is
the first of two key issues that we are studying in this paper.6 
2.2. Random inspection scheme
We focus on the ships coming into the seaport under study from some arbitrary country—say
7country —that is also a trading partner of Home. These ships come into the Home seaport over time
and sequentially. We suppose that on the basis of previously collected historical data, our seaport
inspection agency has determined that there is a fixed probability  that a given arriving ship from
country  will have one or more invasive species on it. Hence, such an arriving ship will fail to pass
our agency’s inspection. We also suppose that whether a particular ship from country  does or does
not have a problem with invasive species does not depend on the status of any other ship arriving in
the Home seaport from this same country  
Our seaport inspection agency in Home proceeds as follows. Initially, it inspects every ship
from country  until  consecutive ships are found not to have any invasive species on them. Once
this happens, our agency then inspects only one out of every  ships from country  at random until
another ship with one or more invasive species on it is discovered. When this happens, our agency
reverts to one hundred percent inspections until  consecutive ships with no invasive species on them
are found. The agency’s inspection continues in this way. The task before us now is to compute the
average fraction of all country  ships that are and are not inspected. In what follows, we shall use
the acronyms  and  to refer to these two averages. Our computation proceeds in three
steps.
In the first step, let state  denote the  consecutive country  ships with
no invasive species that have been found during the one hundred percent inspection part of the
scheme. Also, let state  denote the fact that the inspection scheme under study is in the second
stage in which one out of every  country  ships is being inspected randomly. Time  follows the 
ship, whether or not it is inspected. Now, the reader should note that the above described sequence
7For textbook accounts of Markov chains, the reader should consult Taylor and Karlin (1998, chapter 4) or Ross (2003, chapter 4).
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o f  s t a t e s  i s  a  M a r k o v  c h a i n 7  w i t h  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t y
 Mathematically, we have
(1)
In the second step, we specify the limiting probabilities for the Markov chain whose transition
probabilities are given in equation (1) and then we solve the equations that are satisfied by these
limiting probabilities. To this end, let  be the limiting probability that the stochastic system we are
studying is in state  for  To solve for these limiting probabilities, we have to specify
the equations that these limiting probabilities satisfy. These equations are
(2)
(3)
(4)
and we keep going in this manner until we get to
(5)
and
(6)
Manipulating equations (3) through (5) we can tell that  for 
Similarly, simplifying equation (5) we get  Having ascertained  in terms of 
for  we can now use equation (6) and then simplify the resulting expression to get
9(7)
In the third step, we provide explicit closed-form expressions for the two averages of interest,
that is,  and  respectively. Because each ship is inspected when in states 
but only one out of  ships is inspected in state  we can infer that
 Simplifying this last expression and then using the fact that
 we get
 and (8)
Equation (8) tells us that in the random inspection scheme of this paper, the average fraction
of arriving ships from country  that are inspected depends fundamentally on the fixed probability 
that a given arriving ship will have one or more invasive species on it and on the positive integer 
describing the number of ships out of which one will be inspected at random in the second stage. It
is straightforward to verify that when either  or  our random inspection scheme becomes a
deterministic scheme in which all arriving ships from country  are inspected by the agency. Finally,
when  the average fraction of ships that are inspected depends only on the positive integer  and
as  increases (decreases), the average fraction of ships inspected decreases (increases). This
completes the discussion of the first of two key issues that we are studying in this paper. We now
proceed to the second key issue. This involves computing the average total fines that will be collected
in the long run by our inspection agency when it uses the random inspection scheme of this section
to screen arriving ships for the presence of invasive species.
8For a more detailed corroboration of this claim, see Wanamaker (2008) and go to www.env.go.jp/en/nature/as/040427.pdf,
www.state.hi.us/dlnr/Aliens3.html, and www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/fsheet_faq_notice/fs_phcivilp.html.
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If we were to explicitly separate fine paying ships from non-fine paying ships then the underlying mathematics would get unduly
complicated. Therefore, to keep the subsequent mathematics straightforward, we are supposing that every ship pays a fine. The reader
should not interpret this modeling feature literally. Put differently, the reader should interpret the “fines” paid by ships that pass
inspection as a processing fee and not as a punitive measure. Having said this, the salient point to note here is that the individual ship
fines are random variables and we are explicitly modeling this point.
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2.3. Average total fines
In the previous section, we described the way in which our random inspection scheme would
work for ships arriving from a particular country  However, it is clear that in addition to country 
ships from many other countries—with which Home trades—also arrive in the seaport under study.
Further, there is an inspection protocol in place for the ships from every relevant country. Having said
this, the next question that arises concerns the status of ships that fail our agency’s inspection. In
practice, agencies responsible for the management of invasive species in many countries such as
Japan and the US levy fines on non-compliant entities.8 Therefore, in the remainder of this section,
we suppose that ships—from all the pertinent countries—that fail our agency’s inspection are fined
and that the magnitude of these fines depends on the extent to which a particular ship is not in
compliance with existing laws and regulations in Home. Put differently, the magnitude (dollar value)
of the individual ship fines are random variables.
To model this feature of the problem, we proceed as follows. At the beginning of each time
period, ships from the various countries with which Home trades arrive in the seaport under study
at the times of a renewal process with distribution law given by  We suppose that for every
arriving ship, there is an inspector available to inspect this ship. Upon the completion of the
inspection process, each ship pays a random fine to our agency and the amounts of this fine are
described by the distribution law  where 9 Let  denote the total amount of all the fines
10
For textbook expositions of renewal theory, the reader should consult Taylor and Karlin (1998, chapter 7) or Ross (2003, chapter
7).
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from the various ships that have been collected by our inspection agency by time  The outstanding
task before us now is to provide an explicit stochastic characterization of the total amount 
To this end, let  denote the successive individual ship fines and let  denote
the total number of ships that arrive in the Home seaport in the time interval  We can now
express the fine total  as a particular sum and that sum is
(9)
The reader will note that the sum  in equation (9) is a random variable. Therefore, it makes sense
to focus not on  per se but on its expectation  Consistent with the discussion in section
1, the most convenient way to compute the above expectation would be to take a long run view of
inspections and fines and compute the limiting expectation given by  Now, the
theory of renewal processes10 tells us that  where  and  denote the
fines and time respectively. The two expectations on the right-hand-side (RHS) of the previous
expression can be simplified further. This simplification gives us the limiting expectation we seek
in its simplest form. Specifically, we get
(10)
Equation (10) gives us a closed-form expression for the average total fines that will be
collected in the long run by our inspection agency when it uses the random inspection scheme of
section 2.2 to screen arriving ships for the presence of invasive species. The information contained
12
in equation (10) can be used to facilitate the general task of invasive species management in two
ways. First, this equation can be used to determine whether it is feasible to make the conduct of
inspections by our agency a revenue-neutral operation. Put differently, the objective here would be
to ascertain whether it is possible to meet the agency’s costs with the revenue from the collected
fines. Second, equation (10) can play the role of a constraint in an expected net social benefit from
inspections maximization problem. The idea here would be to conduct ship inspections efficiently
so that the net social benefit from inspections is maximized and, at the same time, the fine based
revenue generated by these inspections does not fall below an exogenously given threshold. This
concludes our discussion of the second key issue of this paper. 
3. Conclusions
In this paper, we conducted a theoretical analysis of inspections in a stochastic environment
and we shed light on two hitherto unstudied issues concerning inspections in the context of invasive
species management. First, given a particular port of entry, we analyzed the properties of a random
inspection scheme. Second, we computed the average total fines that will be collected in the long run
by an inspection agency that uses the above inspection scheme to screen arriving ships for the
presence of one or more invasive species. 
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. Here are two suggestions
for extending the research described in this paper. First, we treated the probability  that an
individual ship from a particular country will have one or more invasive species on it as exogenous
to the analysis. Therefore, it would be useful to formally study the estimation of this important
probability. Second, following the discussion towards the end of section 2.3, it would be useful to set
up and solve an optimization problem involving the efficient allocation of inspection resources and
13
the attainment of a threshold level of revenue from fines. Studies of inspections in invasive species
management that incorporate these features of the problem into the analysis will provide further
insights into a management function that has significant economic and ecological implications.
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